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The 2015 Report on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: a New Framework for UN 
Peacekeeping?  
 
by Christine Gray, Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge 
 
Introduction       
A comprehensive new report on UN peace operations by a High-level Independent 
Panel has just appeared: Uniting Our Strengths for Peace - Politics, Partnership and 
People (hereafter the “2015 Report”).1 In its Executive Summary the Report speaks of 
the changed and changing environment facing UN peace operations. “UN peace 
operations have proven highly adaptable and contributed significantly to the successful 
resolution of conflicts and to a declining number of conflicts over two decades. Today, 
however, there is evidence of a worrisome reversal of some of this trend and a widely 
shared concern that changes in conflict may be outpacing the ability of UN peace 
operations to respond. The spread of violent extremism, overlaid into long-simmering 
local or regional conflicts and the growing aspirations of populations for change, is 
placing pressure on governments and the international system to respond. As UN 
peace operations struggle to achieve their objectives, change is required to adapt them 
to new circumstances and to ensure their increased effectiveness and appropriate use 
in future.”2  
The new report comes at a time of major divisions between states about the rules 
governing peacekeeping: there are debates as to the interpretation of the traditional 
principles of peacekeeping, the proper scope of the use of force by peacekeeping 
forces and the primary role of the Security Council in the context of its relationship 
with troop- contributing countries.3 Much controversy has been provoked by recent 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. Have the operations in Mali and the DRC brought 
a fundamental change of approach? If so, is this a desirable development? The 
divisions between states on the desirability of robust peacekeeping and on the 
protection of civilians were very apparent in recent General Assembly debates and in 
the debates of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping.4 
The 2015 Report has been published 15 years after the influential Brahimi Report 
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on UN Peace Operations which had been drawn up for the UN Millennium Summit 
(2000).5 Since then there have been many significant developments. The assumption 
on which the Brahimi Report was based - that the UN would launch only one new 
major operation each year - has been overtaken. In the twenty-first century, there has 
been a massive surge in peacekeeping since 2003; this has led to concern about 
overstretch. The UN has experienced serious difficulties in obtaining enough 
personnel and equipment for its peacekeeping operations. Today there are sixteen 
peacekeeping operations, nine of which are in Africa. They include over 100,000 
military and police personnel, compared with just 34,000 in 2000. The peacekeeping 
budget for the current year is nearly US$ 8.5 billion, an apparently very large amount 
that exceeds the UN’s current regular budget of US$ 5.5 billion, but - to put it into 
perspective - an amount which is only about 0.5% of total world military spending. 
The experience of peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report created a new awareness 
of the danger of relapse into conflict after a peacekeeping operation is withdrawn. For 
example, in the Central African Republic terrible inter-communal violence broke out 
in 2012 after the departure of an earlier UN peacekeeping operation. Liberia returned 
to conflict in 2003 after an earlier peacekeeping operation had completed its task in 
1997. Somalia was without an effective and stable government for many years after 
the UN peacekeeping operation was withdrawn in 1995; even today the security 
situation is extremely fragile and the AU force, AMISOM, struggles to fulfil its 
mandate. This awareness of the danger of relapse has led to a renewed focus on 
peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Commission set up following the recommendations 
of the Brahimi Report currently operates in six African states.6  
Moreover, there is a corresponding focus on “multidimensional” peacekeeping 
operations, operations that are designed to secure the transition from conflict to stable 
government. Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not 
only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect 
civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former 
combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights 
and assist in restoring the rule of law. The current peacekeeping operations in Mali 
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(MINUSMA) and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) were expressly given the 
titles of multidimensional operations: the UN Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Missions in Mali and the CAR.7 The Security Council in its first general 
resolution on peacekeeping for 10 years, Resolution 2086 (2013), focused on 
multidimensional operations. It emphasized that “UN peacekeeping activities should 
be conducted in a manner so as to facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding, prevention of 
relapse into armed conflict and progress towards sustainable peace and development”; 
it recognized the important role of multidimensional peacekeeping missions to assist 
host countries, and it sets out the types of functions that they could be mandated to 
carry out.  
Since the Brahimi Report, there is also an increased awareness of the contrasting 
danger that a UN peacekeeping operation may freeze the situation and may remain in 
existence indefinitely despite the lack of progress towards a political solution. The 
2015 Report points out that “An older generation of small cease-fire monitoring 
missions has endured for decades with no end in sight.”8 The lack of any serious 
progress in resolving the decades-old political situations raised the question whether 
they should be ended. This is currently being debated with regard to UNFICYP in 
Cyprus (established to prevent further fighting between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots in 1964, and kept on following the 1974 Turkish invasion to supervise the 
ceasefire and maintain the buffer zone between Turkish-occupied North Cyprus and 
the rest of the island). Similarly, the small ceasefire monitoring mission in Jammu and 
Kashmir, UNGOMAP, was established in 1949 and remains today. Other 
long-established missions in the Middle East have run into problems as a result of the 
conflict in Syria.9 The 2015 Report recognizes that some of the ceasefire monitoring 
missions face threats from non-state armed groups: “The parameters for success or 
failure of these missions has never been fully articulated, nor has the point at which 
such missions should be withdrawn or replaced by another form of international 
engagement.”10 The Report says that, in environments where new conflict has emerged 
and threatens the mission, these question become more pressing. While these 
questions are considered, significant investments are needed to better protect and 
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empower mission personnel in the course of their duties. 
The large-scale operation in Haiti, initially created in 2004 after the breakdown of 
law and order following a coup, and reconfigured after the 2010 earthquake, has also 
given rise to the questions how long a peacekeeping operation should continue and 
whether a peacekeeping operation is any longer a suitable instrument to address 
Haiti’s problems.11 The hybrid AU/UN operation UNAMID was set up in Darfur 
(Sudan) in 2007 following the widespread violence against civilians; it remains there 
today, despite the fact that for many years there was no progress towards  a political 
solution. Hopes of an inclusive political settlement were raised following the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur (2011), but these have been weakened by the 
continuing violence.12  
In response to these concerns that the presence of a peacekeeping operation may 
just freeze a situation, peacekeeping operations today typically conduct regular 
strategic reviews of their size and mandate, and plan for their exit strategy. For 
example, the government of the DRC and the UN have entered into a strategic 
dialogue to develop a road map and exit strategy for MONUSCO.13 This was set up to 
succeed an earlier UN peacekeeping operation, MONUC, after stability had been 
restored to most of the DRC. Serious violence against civilians had continued in the 
east, and MONUSCO was established under Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) 
to use all necessary means to protect civilians, and to contribute to stabilization and 
peace consolidation in that difficult environment.  
The 2015 Report 
The 2015 Report starts by setting out the context, painting a grim picture of the 
challenges facing UN peacekeeping.14 Conflicts are on the rise again; the number of 
civil wars has increased in the last few years; there has been an increase in attacks by 
governments and armed groups against civilians. This increase is compounded by a 
rise in violent extremism. Transnational criminal networks trafficking in drugs, 
weapons, people and money have embedded themselves in many conflicts, feeding on 
them and fueling them with funds and weapons. Many conflicts are caused by bad 
governance; “when peaceful protests fail to bring about compromise violence often 
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ensues and, in its path, the reopening of historic wounds, the hardening of religious or 
ethnic competitive identities, regional entanglements and, at times, the accentuation of 
international rivalries.”  
Many of today’s conflicts are less conducive to political resolution. Many result 
from entrenched long-term conflict punctuated by episodic relapse into large-scale 
violence.15 And today many UN peacekeeping operations operate in very challenging 
environments. According to the 2015 Report, “Many contemporary UN missions are 
struggling in complex political contexts and difficult operating environments. . .  A 
growing number of missions operate in remote and austere environments where no 
political agreement exists. . . . They face ongoing hostilities and parties who are 
unwilling to negotiate or who undermine the presence of a mission by inflicting 
restrictions on its freedom to operate. The challenge is multiplied in large, 
infrastructure-poor countries where it becomes much harder for UN missions to make 
their presence felt.”16 Several current UN peacekeeping operations face these types of 
challenges: MINUSMA in Mali, MONUSCO in the DRC, UNAMID in Darfur, and 
UNMISS in South Sudan. But a credibility gap has opened between the ambitious 
mandates and high expectations of peace operations on the one hand, and the 
challenges on the ground.17 
The 2015 Report in its Calls for Change therefore proposes “four essential shifts” 
in the design and implementation of peace operations.18 First, politics must drive the 
design and implementation of peace operations. Lasting peace is achieved not through 
military and technical engagements, but through political solutions. Second, the full 
spectrum of UN peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing 
needs on the ground.19 Third, a stronger, more inclusive peace and security partnership 
is needed for the future, meaning increased cooperation with regional organizations. 
Fourth, the UN Secretariat must become more field-focused and UN peace operations 
must be more people-centred. The report then goes on to set out “new approaches” for 
UN peace operations: conflict prevention and mediation must be brought to the fore; 
protection of civilians is a core obligation of the UN, but expectations and capability 
must converge; clarity is needed on the use of force and in the role of UN peace 
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operations in managing conflict. Much of the 2015 Report concerns practical matters, 
and the Secretary-General’s Report on implementation of the 2015 Report also focuses 
primarily on these.20 He proposes “three key changes”. First, the UN with the support 
of member states needs to prioritize prevention and mediation; second, it needs to 
change the way it plans and conducts UN peace operations so that they become faster 
and more agile; third, it needs stronger regional partnerships.21   
New Approaches: conflict prevention 
If we look beyond the general aims set out in the 2015 Report to its more specific  
recommendations for reform, the similarities to the Brahimi Report are striking in 
many places. This is a clear indication that many of the Brahimi Report’s central 
recommendations have not yet been implemented. Although they may have seemed 
simple and sensible, in practice they proved to be elusive goals. Thus, the calls in the 
2015 Report for increased focus on the prevention of conflict echo those of the 
Brahimi Report.22 The 2015 Report finds that, despite the unassailable logic of early 
investment in conflict prevention, to forestall the need for much larger expenditure “at 
the bottom of the cliff” when lives have been lost and billions of dollars lost to war, 
conflict prevention was still under-resourced. But the Report’s calls for an 
international forum to agree on innovative approaches does not inspire much 
confidence, and the suggestion that the Security Council should engage earlier to 
address emerging threats, however desirable, seems sadly unlikely to be any more 
effective today than it has been in the past. Perhaps the call for a regular budget for the 
Secretariat’s prevention and mediation capacities, and for internal measures to ensure 
attention to prevention by all UN agencies and programmes will  prove of greater 
practical significance?23 And it is this practical area that the Secretary-General has 
focused on in his report on the implementation of the 2015 Report. 
New Approaches: protection of civilians by peacekeeping operations 
One of the most important (and most controversial) developments since the Brahimi 
Report has been the increased emphasis on the protection of civilians by UN 
peacekeeping forces.24 Ever since the failure of the UN forces to protect civilians from 
massacres in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina) (1995), there has 
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been a greater focus on this aspect of peacekeeping. UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone was 
the first peacekeeping operation to be given this explicit mandate under Chapter VII in 
Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999). Nine of the 16 current peacekeeping 
operations include this task as part of their mandates. The Brahimi Report dealt with 
this aspect of peacekeeping relatively briefly. It said that all operations should be 
regarded as having an implied power to protect civilians; peacekeepers who witness 
violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their 
means, in support of basic UN principles. Where operations were given a broad and 
explicit mandate for civilian protection they should be given the specific resources 
necessary to implement their mandate. However, these recommendations proved 
difficult to implement in practice in many cases, where state authority was weak, 
infrastructure was defective or non-existent, and where peacekeepers were deployed 
into ongoing armed conflict. Many peacekeeping operations experienced problems in 
the implementation of this mandate. Perhaps the best known example of failure to 
protect was that of MONUC in the DRC; it experienced great difficulties in protecting 
civilians in the east of the country. Its failure to prevent rapes and massacres in 2008 - 
9 led to an outcry about the ineffectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations.25  
This increasingly prominent aspect of peacekeeping is one on which there are 
differences between states. The protection of civilians may seem an obviously 
laudable aim, but it is not unproblematic. First, several states argue that provisions for 
the protection of civilians should not serve as a pretext for intervention.26 They were 
apparently led to take this position in response to the NATO-led operation in Libya 
(2011). Many asserted that the NATO military action had been taken to support the 
armed opposition against Colonel Gaddafi in order to secure regime change. They said 
that it went beyond the scope of Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), which had 
authorized the use of all necessary means “to protect civilians and civilian-populated 
areas under threat of attack”. Russia argued that a mandate requiring the protection of 
civilians creates a danger that UN peacekeeping operations could compromise their 
neutrality and be drawn into internal political conflicts in such a way that they support 
one of the parties.27 Second, some states have stressed that such mandates will raise 
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expectations and that it is important that the operations be given the resources 
necessary to carry out their mandate to protect civilians. In the 2014 Security Council 
debate on the protection of civilians several states stressed the practical problems.28 
Some argued that the UN operations in South Sudan and the CAR, whose mandates 
gave express priority to the protection of civilians, demonstrated these difficulties. 
When operations were first given the mandate to protect civilians, not much attention 
was given to the details of what this would involve. It has been left to individual 
operations to work out practical measures to improve their intelligence gathering and 
early warning systems and to involve local people in this. States continue to call for 
clear, detailed rules.29 Third, some states have asked whether the protection of 
civilians is compatible with the other aims of a peacekeeping operation in cases where 
it has a robust mandate.30 If UN forces are engaged in robust military action, this 
fighting may have a negative impact on civilians in the area and their protection may 
be more difficult. This may be seen in Security Council Resolution 2217 (2015) on 
MINUSCA in the CAR which provided that MINUSCA should “mitigate risks to 
civilians posed by its military operations.” 
The 2015 Report examines the issue of protection of civilians at greater length than 
the Brahimi Report. It does not address concerns about impartiality and 
non-intervention and it does not consider the compatibility of the protection of 
civilians with robust peacekeeping. It says that it is not acceptable for the Security 
Council to simply stand by when an armed conflict escalates and puts civilian 
populations at risk of mass atrocities. The international community through the 
Security Council must be able to muster swift and capable responses; it should have at 
its disposal robust, fast-deploying, first responder capabilities. If necessary it should 
draw on regional organizations for a first response.  
Nevertheless, the Report does recognize the difficulties involved.31 The Panel is 
concerned about the credibility and achievability of a blanket mandate in this area; 
there are hundreds and thousands of civilians in current UN Mission areas who are 
exposed to risks of violence, and the UN forces currently deployed could not protect 
more than a small fraction of them. Where missions are deployed into increasingly 
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demanding environments they are struggling to fulfil their protection obligations. 
There was a need to close the gap: member states must provide the mission with 
adequate  capabilities to implement the mandate. Many missions with protection 
responsibilities are currently severely under-resourced. Some lack what are today 
commonly referred to as “critical enablers” - helicopters, engineering capacities and 
medical facilities. Some operate under rules that prevent the full use of these 
capacities because individual troop-contributing countries have different operating 
rules for their troops.32 
The 2015 Report says “No mission can protect all civilians at all times.” 
Expectations concerning the mission’s ability to protect civilians are often unrealistic. 
This has been a serious challenge to the UN. Its credibility has been undermined when 
civilians have been attacked in a peacekeeping operation’s area of operations. But it is 
difficult to provide practical solutions for this. The 2015 Report recommends only that 
missions and host governments should communicate frequently and honestly with the 
host population to manage expectations with regard to the mandate. It asserts that the 
Security Council has a major responsibility to ensure that expectations are realistic.  
The 2015 Report also says that protection mandates must be linked explicitly to 
political solutions. To do otherwise denies the mission a viable exit strategy and 
provides only palliative protection for civilians.33 A mandate focused exclusively, or 
even predominantly, on the protection of civilians is likely to lead to a long drawn out 
and ultimately unwinnable campaign. This view of the Panel indicates the need for a 
reappraisal of the mandates given to peacekeeping operations such as those recently 
created in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and South Sudan (UNMISS). 
Their mandates were drawn up in response to violence against civilians in ongoing 
conflicts, and the protection of civilians was made the explicit priority of the 
peacekeeping operations.  
New approaches: Clarity on the use of force 
The third “new approach” set out in the 2015 Report is the call for “clarity on the 
use of force and in the role of UN peace operations in managing conflict”. Again this 
has been the source of much disagreement between states. African states typically call 
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for robust action, whereas others including Russia, China and many Latin American 
states call for limited use of force and respect for the traditional principles of 
peacekeeping.34  
The Brahimi Report recommended that the UN undertake robust peacekeeping to 
avoid problems like those of Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda. It should not leave 
peacekeeping operations unable to act against spoilers: “Rules of engagement should 
be sufficiently robust and not force UN contingents to cede the initiative to their 
attackers.”35 However, the Brahimi Report’s discussion was relatively brief.36 Since 
then many new peacekeeping operations have been set up under Chapter VII, or 
authorized to use all necessary means under Chapter VII in defence of their mandate 
or to protect civilians. In particular, the wide mandates of the peacekeeping operations 
in the DRC and in Mali have provoked much controversy.37  
The 2015 Report deals with this question at some length in its section on The use of 
force for peace and protection.38 The past decade has shown that the difficulties of 
mandate implementation increase when there is little or no peace to keep. The UN 
today finds itself in more difficult operating environments. First, new challenges face 
ceasefire monitoring missions.39 Second, multidimensional peacekeeping operations in 
support of a peace agreement or a political transition may be stretched thin over 
“large, austere operating environments” and may face  spoilers who seek to 
undermine the peace process; the peace process may have frayed. Third, several UN 
missions are being called upon to undertake what the report calls “conflict 
management” roles in situations of violent conflict and in the absence of a viable 
peace process. Such missions are being asked to deter escalation, contain conflict, 
protect civilians and to attempt to start of revive a peace process. The concepts, tools, 
mission structures and doctrine originally developed for peace implementation tasks 
may not be well-suited for these settings.40  
The 2015 Report recommends extreme caution with regard to conflict management. 
In order to enable the peace operations to operate with even limited success, such 
missions should be deployed only if certain conditions are met. The most important of 
these are as follows. The mandate must be clear and achievable, reflecting the 
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language of the Brahimi Report, and Security Council Resolutions 1327 (2000) and 
2086 (2013). The Report says that mandates have grown longer and less realistic; the 
tasks should in future be prioritized and sequenced.41 The mandate should be linked to 
a political strategy. UN missions given conflict management roles should be given 
“focused mission objectives”, working towards an agreement on cessation of 
hostilities, promoting political dialogue, protecting civilians and monitoring human 
rights. Wider civilian tasks that require a peace to keep should be curtailed. These 
“focused mission objectives” are clearly still ambitious in situations of violent conflict.  
The 2015 Report also recommends that UN missions should be able to take a robust 
deterrent posture from the start. Assurances should be sought on the responsibilities 
and commitments of parties to the conflict as a basis for dialogue on managing the 
mission’s presence and activities. Missions should deploy with the necessary military 
and medical capabilities to deal with emergencies upon arrival. They must operate on 
the assumption that the use of force may be necessary from the outset to protect 
civilians and to defend the mission and its mandate.  The Report warns that, where a 
viable political process cannot be established with the parties, a UN peacekeeping 
operation will struggle to succeed. It is clear that these conditions for the deployment 
of operations with a conflict management role will prove very difficult to meet in 
practice. The 2015 Report therefore recommends that the Security Council should 
consider others, including regional organizations, as first-responders. In the face of 
hostilities, and in the absence of fast deploying and interoperable forces, a robust 
military logistics system, strong command and control and ready reserves - none of 
which the UN has invested in or developed to date - UN missions may struggle even to 
reach full operating capability.42  
Similarly, the 2015 Report says that UN peacekeeping missions, owing to their 
composition and character, are not suited to military counter-terrorism operations.43 
They lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized 
military preparation required. Such operations should be undertaken by the host 
government or by a capable regional force or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the 
Security Council. This position may be seen as a response to the experience of 
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MINUSMA in Mali. An uprising by separatists and various Islamist groups including 
AQIM (AlQaida in the Islamic Maghreb) in the north of Mali precipitated a crisis in 
2012.44 The conflict was fuelled by fighters and weapons from the Libyan conflict, and 
the armed groups seized control of two-thirds of Mali. The Security Council initially 
turned to regional organizations to respond to the crisis, but it was not quick to 
authorize action. The Secretary-General argued that the UN should not authorize a 
regional force until it had a realistic mandate and sufficient resources to achieve its 
aims. Accordingly, the Security Council in Resolution 2085 (2012) said that military 
planning would need to be further refined before operations could commence. 
However, Security Council discussions were overtaken by events as the rebels 
advanced towards the capital. France began military action against the rebels in 
Operation Serval, and ECOWAS deployed its forces with financial and logistical 
support from several European states.  
In April 2013 the Security Council acting under Chapter VII passed Resolution 
2100 (2013) which created a new multidimensional peacekeeping operation, 
MINUSMA, to take over from the African force.  Its mandate was to “use all 
necessary means to carry out its mandate” in support of the transitional authorities, and 
to protect civilians on its own or in cooperation with the Malian authorities. The 
resolution reaffirmed the traditional principles of peacekeeping. It was left to the 
French force to take action against terrorists. However, this raised familiar problems 
of characterization: was it possible to determine whether an armed group was part of a 
separatist force (to be confronted by MINUSMA) or a terrorist group (to be left for the 
French forces to deal with)? Russia was the only state to express concern in the 
Security Council at this mandate, but it voted for the resolution, noting that the 
Secretary-General’s Report had made clear the need for a clear boundary between 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Russia stressed that MINUSMA’s mandate did 
not include offensive or counter-terrorism operations: such actions would be counter 
to the basic principles of peacekeeping.45  
Finally, the 2015 Report recognizes that it is the prerogative of the Security Council 
to authorize UN peacekeeping operations to undertake enforcement tasks, including 
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targeted offensive operations, as it did in Somalia in 1993 and the DRC in 2013. These 
mandates involve a shift from the use of force to protect civilians and UN personnel to 
a fundamentally different type of posture that uses offensive force to degrade, 
neutralize or defeat an opponent. The Report advocates extreme caution. Any such 
mandate task should be a time-limited, exceptional measure. They must be conducted 
with “a clear and achievable political end state.”46 Where a UN peacekeeping 
operation is deployed in parallel with a non-UN force conducting military 
counter-terrorism or other offensive operations, a clear division of labour must guide 
their operations. When such non-UN forces depart, the UN should not be called upon 
to assume residual tasks beyond its capability.  
This section of the Report is clearly the response to the controversial role assigned 
to MONUSCO in the DRC by Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013). MONUSCO 
had initially been created as a peacekeeping force in a post conflict environment, to 
protect civilians and to contribute to stabilization and peace consolidation in the east 
of the DRC. But there was very little security in the area, and in 2012 the M23 group 
mutinied against the national army and began to make major advances in the east. In 
response to a call by the Secretary-General and with the support of the DRC, the 
Security Council established a special Intervention Brigade within MONUSCO, “on 
an exceptional basis”. It stressed that this should not create a precedent and did not 
prejudice the traditional principles of peacekeeping. Resolution 2098 (2013) contains 
unprecedented language: the Intervention Brigade was to neutralize armed groups; it 
was to carry out “targeted offensive operations”, either unilaterally or jointly with the 
DRC army, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner, to prevent the expansion 
of armed groups.  
The UK and France gave their strong support to this new departure for UN 
peacekeeping.47 However, Russia and China expressed reservations. For Russia, it was 
important that the resolution had reaffirmed support for the traditional principles of 
peacekeeping; for China this should not be regarded as a precedent. There were also 
several calls for more consultations with troop-contributing countries (TCCs). The 
Intervention Brigade began operations in July 2013, and the DRC’s armed forces 
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defeated M23 in November 2013, with the support of MONUSCO.48 The 
Secretary-General reported that MONUSCO had not in fact undertaken purely 
offensive operations; it had provided support to the offensive operations of the DRC’s 
armed forces, and critical logistical support.49 
After its identification of the different types of peacekeeping operation, the 2015 
Report discusses the three traditional principles of peacekeeping: consent of the 
parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the 
mandate.50 It notes that some states, including many leading TCCs, take the strong 
view that these principles should be upheld; other states say that they are outmoded 
and require adjustment. The 2015 Report essentially repeats the position of the 
Brahimi Report on the meaning of “impartiality” and “consent”, but the scope of the 
right to use force gives rise to difficult questions. The 2015 Report accepts the 
importance of the core principles where peacekeeping operations observe ceasefires or 
implement peace agreements, but says that they should never be used as an excuse for 
failure to protect civilians or defend the mission pro-actively. “Two decades of 
peacekeeping experience in more volatile settings calls for a flexible and progressive 
interpretation of these principles.”51 The obvious question is just how flexible and how 
progressive should the interpretation of the traditional principles be?  
The 2015 Report says that self-defence is a well-recognized concept, but the 
concept of defence of the mandate requires clarity as to which tasks within the 
mandate may require the use of force. It should always include the responsibility to 
protect civilians and to be proactive in doing so. The Secretary-General accepts that an 
explicit mandate to protect civilians must include the use of force. He says that “this 
has been defined to mean preventive, pre-emptive and tactical use of force to protect 
civilians under threat of physical violence”,52 but he does not specify the source of this 
definition. The earlier debates leading up to the adoption of the Capstone doctrine on 
peacekeeping in 2008 had revealed marked divisions between states about the use of 
such language.53 There are signs that the UN is now committed to a more robust 
approach to the protection of civilians, despite the reservations of some states. For 
example, UNMISS was recently authorised in Security Council Resolution 2241 
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(2015) to deter violence against civilians, especially through proactive deployment and 
“active patrolling”. 
Defence of the mandate going beyond protection of civilians is also problematic, 
and could lead to a wide use of force, as the UN Secretary-General had recognized in 
the early days of peacekeeping.54 But this is not considered at any length by the 2015 
Report or the Secretary-General. Is it always possible to draw a line between the use of 
force in pro-active defence of the mission or defence of the mandate on the one hand, 
and enforcement action or counter-terrorism (which the 2015 Report regarded as 
generally not suitable for peacekeeping operations) on the other? The 2015 Report 
says that clarity as to what is required for any particular mission would be contained 
not in doctrine, but in clear and mission-specific statements, guidelines for TCCs and 
rules of engagement.55  
Empowering the Field (1): filling the commitment gap 
The “new approaches” just discussed (in particular the protection of civilians and 
clarity on the use of force) are to be underpinned by important changes to the design 
and delivery of peace operations; these are discussed in the section on Empowering the 
Field.  The Brahimi Report wrote of the “commitment gap”, the gap between the 
mandate that the Security Council assigned to an operation and the resources 
necessary for it to implement that mandate. UN peacekeeping could only be effective 
if member states contributed sufficient numbers of trained and equipped troops and the 
logistical support necessary for them to carry out their mandate. The 2015 Report 
returns to this fundamental issue in its discussion of new approaches for UN peace 
operations.  
The Brahimi Report recommended a two-step process to avoid the problems of the 
commitment gap: new peacekeeping operations should not be established until 
member states had guaranteed sufficient personnel and equipment to enable the 
peacekeeping operation to carry out its mandate. But in practice this recommendation 
was never implemented. It ran up against the pressure on the UN and on member 
states to take action in response to a crisis. Even after the Brahimi Report it continued 
to be the norm rather than the exception for the UN to establish an operation before it 
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had the necessary resources. A central concern of the Brahimi Report was the need for 
the rapid deployment of troops and equipment, and it made detailed recommendations 
designed to achieve this aim, but UN peacekeeping operations today still face serious 
problems in obtaining personnel and equipment. In practice the UN still turns to 
regional organizations and to individual member states for the first response to a 
conflict. In Mali it was an African-led force (with France) that first responded to the 
advances of separatist and terrorist forces in 2013. In the CAR, when inter-communal 
violence escalated in 2013, it was an AU mission (with France) that was authorized to 
go in first, to take all necessary measures to contribute to the protection of civilians, 
the stabilization of the country, the restoration of state authority over the whole 
territory of the country. 
The 2015 Report calls for rapid deployment. It says that “slow deployment is one of 
the greatest impediments to more effective peace operations. When a missions trickles 
into a highly demanding environment, it is dangerously exposed on the ground and 
initial high expectations turn to disappointment, frustration and anger.”56 It recognizes 
that the proposals of the Brahimi Report on rapid deployment have not been 
implemented. Without its own standby capacity the UN has been unable to come close 
to the targets set out in the Brahimi Report - 30 days for a traditional mission, and 90 
days for a complex mission. The average deployment time for a UN contingent was 
six months. The 2015 Report  acknowledges that  previous calls for a global standby 
capacity have foundered. The UN Secretary-General had first proposed a UN standing 
capacity in 1948, but no significant progress has been made. Accordingly the 2015 
Report now proposes that a small UN vanguard capacity should be considered to allow 
the UN to insert a quick-responding UN military force into a new area, or to reinforce 
an existing mission. A reliable system of fast-responding regional or Member State 
capabilities is required for the future, based on national standby arrangements. This 
would provide a first response capacity where slower-deploying UN peace operations 
were not a viable option for a crisis.57 The Secretary-General’s Report on the 
implementation of the 2015 Report accordingly puts forward faster and more agile 
peacekeeping operations as the second key change to be achieved.58 
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The 2015 Report says that, given the growing needs for more advanced capabilities 
in missions, it is crucial to reverse the decline in contributions from many 
high-capability countries. As regards the supply of troops by developed states, the 
2015 Report is more outspoken than the Brahimi Report had been. Developed states at 
the time of the 2015 Report made only a small contribution of troops to UN 
peacekeeping.59 The special strategic military cell that they provided to UNIFIL when 
its size was increased and its mandate was expanded in 2006, following the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon, was an exception. It remains to be seen whether Mali will prove 
a turning point; the Netherlands has provided a significant number of troops to 
MINUSMA, and other developed states have also contributed. As regards the 
permanent members of the Security Council, the USA currently supplies hardly any 
peacekeeping troops. It does, however, provide over a quarter of the peacekeeping 
budget. In contrast, China supplies only about 7% of the budget, but it has very 




The 2015 Report takes the position that it is particularly important that the forces of 
permanent members of the Security Council participate in UN peacekeeping 
operations, including those with protection of civilian mandates.60 Such military 
participation would restore the full partnership among member states and send a strong 
message about the confidence of the Security Council in a mission. This could make a 
difference in the quality of policy deliberations at UN headquarters as much as it could 
impact effectiveness in the field. Accordingly, the 2015 Report says that “Members of 
the Security Council, and in particular its permanent members, as well as other 
member states with required capabilities, are encouraged to offer their troops for UN 
operations so as to provide these missions with essential capabilities and to signal their 
resolve, in particular in support of mandates to protect civilians.”  
It seems that this recommendation has met receptive ears; it has certainly produced 
a very quick response. The USA will not itself make any significant increase in the 
number of troops it provides, but it did organize a meeting of over 50 states on 28 
September 2015 for a Leaders’ Summit on UN Peace Operations to pledge new 
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commitments.61 It was reported that member states have pledged 40,000 more troops 
and police, more than 40 helicopters, 15 military engineering companies and 10 field 
hospitals.62 China made the largest commitment of troops: it said it would establish a 
standby force of 8,000 soldiers. But it expressed concern that peacekeeping should not 
be exploited for political ends. The basic principles of peacekeeping should be strictly 
followed. There are indeed concerns about the involvement of all the permanent 
members of the Security Council in peacekeeping, concerns that they will pursue their 
own political and economic ends.63 
Empowering the Field (2): Triangular consultations with Troop Contributing 
Countries  
As part of the 2015 Report’s consideration of how to implement its new approaches 
and make peacekeeping more effective, it returns to the  Brahimi Report’s 
recommendation that there should be a new three-way relationship between the 
Security Council, the UN Secretariat and troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Some 
progress was made on this following the Brahimi Report. Security Council 
Resolutions 1327 (2000) and 1353 (2001) made provision for a new system of 
cooperation. Regular meetings of the Security Council and TCCs are now held. But 
leading TCCs are still not content. Many speak out at debates on peacekeeping, calling 
for further improvements.64 India regularly complains that the Security Council still 
mandates operations without adequate input from the TCCs. This is not acceptable 
when mandates may make peacekeepers a party to conflict, putting at risk their lives 
and their missions.65  In support of its call for better consultation, it invokes Article 44 
UN Charter.66 This provides that “When the Security Council has decided to use force 
it shall, before calling upon a Member State not represented on it to provide armed 
forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if 
the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council 
concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces”. Article 43 
has never been implemented, but the principle set out in Article 44 is clear. It provides 
not just for consultation, but for participation in the decisions of the Security Council. 
That is, the Security Council has the primary role in the maintenance of international 
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peace and security, but the TCCs should also have an input into decision-making. The 
Non-Aligned Movement supports this position.67 
The 2015 Report accordingly returns to this question. Like the Brahimi Report, it 
says that TCCs are not sufficiently consulted in mandate formation and renewal.68 
“The lack of effective dialogue through so-called triangular consultations . . . has 
generated frustration on all sides, and has impacted mandate implementation.” The 
Security Council should now institutionalize a framework to engage TCCs early in the 
mandate formulation process, in accordance with prior commitments such as Security 
Council Resolution 1353 (2001). The Secretary-General, also reflecting the Brahimi 
position, has stressed the importance of early triangular consultations to achieve a 
shared understanding of the mandate, threat assessment and specific unit 
requirements.69  
The 2015 Report also addresses another, related problem that has emerged with 
regard to TCCs. Several recent operations have run into problems with “national 
caveats”, the restrictions imposed by TCCs on what their troops may do.70 The 2015 
Report says that the ability of field commanders to ensure performance is severely 
hampered by the use of caveats and national controls. It may be necessary for the 
Secretariat to decline an offer of troops if the caveats will impede performance. In the 
field any further caveats beyond those accepted at the outset cannot be condoned.71  
Empowering the Field (3): strengthening global-regional partnerships  
The 2015 Report devotes significantly more attention than the Brahimi Report to 
the relationship between the UN and regional organizations with regard to 
peacekeeping.72 It builds on developments since the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document, which had called for a stronger relationship.73 Much has already been done 
since then to strengthen the relationship between the UN and regional organizations, in 
particular the AU, and to build up the peacekeeping capacity of the AU. The UN-AU 
partnership has come a long way over the past decade.74 Recent experience in the 
CAR, Mali and Somalia has shown that troops from regional countries are essential as 
first responders, and that they have often brought political commitment, understanding 
of the context, and a direct link to regional political influence and leverage. As we 
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have seen above, the 2015 Report refers to the need to rely on regional organizations 
as first-responders to protect civilians, for conflict management and for 
counter-terrorism operations. Yet many states have cautioned that there are potential 
political risks to regional engagement where national interests of neighbouring 
countries may not be compatible with the intended direction of peace efforts.75 In very 
general terms the 2015 Report now calls on the UN “to craft a collective vision for a 
future global and regional architecture to maintain international peace and security.” 
The UN Secretary-General is to “begin building a consensus for such a vision and to 
propose a roadmap to realize it over the next decade.” In response, the 
Secretary-General has announced that the UN and the AU are taking steps to finalize 
in 2016 a Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and 
Security.76  
The main practical issue (and one with constitutional implications) identified in the 
2015 Report is that of financing for regional peacekeeping operations. The lack of 
sustained, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support AU peace 
operations undermines their sustainability and effectiveness.77 The AU has for many 
years been calling for the UN to fund its regional peacekeeping operations from the 
UN peacekeeping budget when the AU operations were authorized by the UN Security 
Council; the 2015 Report now supports this call “on a case-by-case basis”. The AU in 
its response to the 2015 Report argues strongly for this change.78 It does, however, 
expressly affirm that any enforcement action by the AU must be authorized by the UN 
Security Council under Chapter VII.79 
But the UN Security Council has not previously been willing to accept this 
proposal, and the UN Secretary-General in his report on the implementation of the 
2015 Report does not accept it now: he merely requests another  review of the various 
funding and support mechanisms.80 He does recognize the concerns of the permanent 
members of the Security Council as to the constitutional propriety of funding 
autonomous AU peacekeeping operations from UN funds, and spells out that any 
financing provided by the UN would depend on institutional capability to plan, deploy 
and conduct peace operations effectively, and would be contingent on compliance with 
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UN norms, standards, and financial rules and regulations.  
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Conclusion 
The UN Secretary-General has welcomed the 2015 Report, saying that “such 
windows for comprehensive reform are rare - it is essential that we act urgently, boldly 
and collectively.”81 But reform in this area has proved difficult in the past: conflict 
prevention has been an elusive goal; peacekeeping operations may not prevent relapse 
into conflict; their presence may freeze the situation rather than contribute to a 
political resolution of the conflict. Much of the 2015 Report adopts and builds on the 
(not fully implemented) recommendations of the earlier Brahimi Report. The most 
important obstacle to effective peacekeeping is still the lack of troops and equipment. 
So this latest report represents another attempt at closing the commitment gap and 
securing the rapid deployment necessary for peacekeeping operations to implement 
their mandates and to fulfil the expectations their creation has created. It contains 
strong recommendations that  not only developed states in general, but the permanent 
members (P5) of the Security Council in particular, should step up their contributions 
of peacekeeping forces. This process has been underway since the September 2015 
Leaders’ Summit on Peace Operations, but it has led to some concern that the P5 will 
come to dominate or to transform the nature of peacekeeping.  
The Secretary-General has argued in his report on the implementation of the 2015 
Report that the lack of unity among states over the scope and application of the three 
traditional peacekeeping principles was thwarting their adaptation.82 Some seek a more 
robust approach to peacekeeping operations; others are reluctant to accept such a 
change. The 2015 Report is a mixture of caution and innovation in its pursuit of 
“clarity on the use of force” by peacekeeping operations. It advocates extreme caution 
with regard to operations deployed into ongoing conflict, engaged in what the 2015 
Report calls “conflict management” where there is no peace to keep. In general this 
should be left to others as first responders, rather than undertaken by UN 
peacekeepers. Also, although in theory the Security Council may authorize UN 
peacekeeping operations to undertake enforcement and counter-terrorism operations, 
in practice this should generally be left to others such as the African Union unless 
certain very stringent conditions are met. Many commentators had hailed the 
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revolutionary language of MONUSCO’s mandate in the DRC and the deployment of 
MINUSMA in Mali as signifying the start of a new era of UN peacekeeping. Certain 
states had feared that these developments would transform the nature of peacekeeping 
and lead to the abandonment of the traditional principles. But the 2015 Report was not 
ready to take a radical approach on peace enforcement and counter-terrorism 
operations: as a rule these were still not suitable for UN peacekeeping forces.  
The line between these operations and robust defence of the mandate may not be 
entirely clear. The 2015 Report takes a more radical approach on the protection of 
civilians, which it sees as a core obligation of the UN. It is here that it calls for a 
flexible and progressive interpretation of the traditional principles of peacekeeping. It 
is not swayed by the warnings of certain states that such mandates may serve as a 
pretext for intervention and regime change. It repeats the Brahimi Report’s position 
that all peacekeeping operations have the implied power to protect civilians; it adds 
that where this is an express task then they should be willing and able to undertake the 
proactive use of force. For this robust approach to the protection of civilians to 
succeed, the cooperation of TCCs is crucial. At present their national caveats can 
undermine effective operations. But many of the major contributors are not satisfied 
with their current role. The primary role of the UN Security Council with regard to 
peacekeeping is being questioned in this regard, and with regard to the relationship of 
the UN and “first responders” such as the AU.  
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